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CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL AND MANAGERIAL PARADIGM 
APPLICABLE TO THE MODERN-DAY SAFETY AND SECURITY 
CHALLENGE AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
OREN R. GRIFFIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on campus safety and security in higher education.  In 
light of the numerous stakeholders in higher education that include faculty, law 
enforcement professionals, higher education lawyers, state and federal 
officials, and institutional administrators, this Article examines legal and 
policy considerations that should influence how colleges and universities 
respond to protect the campus community and safeguard the educational 
environment.  In particular, the Article discusses the Incident Command 
System and the impact this management approach has had on the development 
of an organizational framework to manage emergency incidents.  The Article 
also reviews selected case law regarding campus safety and state and federal 
statutory responses designed to minimize threats to campus safety.  Finally, the 
Article acknowledges the role that members of the university community play 
in advancing campus security as well as the application of risk management 
concepts and strategies in the campus safety and security arena.  Recognizing 
that colleges and universities are vital national institutions, the article 
encourages the development of a legal and managerial paradigm to deal with 
the modern-day perplexities of campus safety and security. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As criminal behavior and unprovoked acts of violence have become an 
ever-growing presence in American life, higher education institutions have not 
been spared the experience of being the scene of such acts.  In recent years, 
various active shooter incidents have occurred on college campuses across the 
country and abroad with horrific results.1  Numerous stakeholders, including 
higher education administrators, faculty, law enforcement professionals, higher 
education lawyers, and state and federal officials, among others, have begun to 
examine how colleges and universities should respond to protect the campus 
community and safeguard the educational environment.  As these recent 
campus shootings raise the specter of public concern, educational institutions 
must examine their ability and capacity to respond to emergency incidents on 
campus.2 
This Article explores the complex array of concerns that influence campus 
safety and security.  Addressed first is a discussion of the Incident Command 
System, also referred to as the incident management system, which has been 
recognized by state and federal agencies, public safety and law enforcement 
organizations, and professional groups as providing the necessary framework 
to manage emergency incidents.  Second, the Article examines selected case 
law implicating campus safety, identifying the view courts have taken to the 
liability exposure colleges and universities have experienced and may continue 
to experience.  Third, the Article reviews selected statutory responses designed 
to minimize threats to campus security and safety.  Fourth, the Article 
considers the role that faculty may play in advancing campus security as well 
as the application of risk management concepts and strategies to the campus 
safety and security arena.  The conclusion offers a series of recommendations 
that higher education administrators and their legal counsel may consider as 
their institutions negotiate the modern-day perplexities of campus safety and 
security. 
 
 1. See Timeline: Shootings at U.S. College Campuses, NPR, Apr. 16, 2007, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9603275 (listing shootings from recent 
decades); Anthony DePalma, Questions Outweigh Answers in Shooting Spree at College, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A1; Timeline of School Shootings, BBC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7631162.stm. 
 2. It is troubling that, to the extent administrators, lawyers, and other professionals working 
with educational institutions do not respond promptly and effectively to the emergency 
preparedness concern, the void may be filled with less favorable approaches.  See, e.g., James C. 
McKinley, Jr., In Texas School, Some Teachers Carry Books, Chalk and Pistol, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
29, 2008, at A1 (discussing a proposal to provide guns to teachers and administrators at public 
schools in Texas as a response to safety concerns). 
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II.  INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 
The Incident Command System (“ICS”) encompasses management 
concepts and principles intended to apply in crisis and emergency situations to 
minimize chaos and maximize the potential for an effective response to a 
crisis.3  The ICS management approach originated in the late 1960s in response 
to the devastating wildfires that ravaged southern California.4  Given the 
challenge faced by firefighters and other public safety professionals, ICS 
provided a framework for organizing the critical resources needed to save lives 
and property.5  The ICS was developed through cooperative efforts among 
federal, state, and local governmental agencies in reaction to the harmful 
disorder that existed among agencies that respond to life-threatening events.6  
It represented a significant shift in the approach used to manage large-scale 
emergency incidents.7 
In February 2003, triggered by an imperative need for intergovernmental 
cooperation regarding emergency preparedness, President George W. Bush 
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which legally 
required intergovernmental cooperation for major incident response efforts.8  
HSPD-5 requires all federal agencies to collaborate with the Department of 
Homeland Security to adopt a National Response Plan (“NRP”) and a National 
Incident Management System (“NIMS”).9  The NRP focuses on developing a 
national approach to domestic incident management to incorporate the 
resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental 
organizations.10  Acknowledging ICS as the cornerstone of any disaster 
response effort, NIMS provides a structural framework for incident 
management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause, size, or 
 
 3. ICS is also referred to as the Incident Management System in the relevant literature.  See 
LOUIS N. MOLINO, SR., EMERGENCY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDAMENTALS AND 
APPLICATIONS 1 (2006). 
 4. Id. at 5; see also James Parker, “Be Prepared”: Safety Professionals Must Learn the 
Incident Command System, SAFETY & HEALTH, Apr. 2005, at 26, 26. 
 5. MOLINO, supra note 3, at 7. 
 6. Gregory A. Bigley & Karlene H. Roberts, The Incident Command System: High-
Reliability Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1281, 
1282 (2001). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5-Management of Domestic Incidents, 
I PUB. PAPERS 229 (Feb. 28, 2003). 
 9. William C. Nicholson, Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security Standards: Adopting 
the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 
491, 495 (2006) (citing Press Release, White House, Homeland Security Directive/HSPD 5, 16 
(Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases.2003/02/2003022 
89.html). 
 10. Id. at 511. 
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complexity of the emergency incident.11  NIMS’s basic components include 
preparedness, communications and information management, resource 
management, and command and management.12  In support of these 
components, ICS serves as the backbone for NIMS, and provides emergency 
responders an organizational structure free from cumbersome jurisdictional 
impediments.13  Since its inception, ICS has evolved into an “all-risk” system 
capable of responding to any emergency, irrespective of type or scope.14  Also, 
ICS has begun to have a presence in federal and state statutory law.15 
ICS represents a comprehensive on-site incident management approach 
that provides a flexible organizational framework to respond to small and 
large-scale emergency situations.  The organizational structure implemented 
through ICS seeks to efficiently and effectively coordinate the efforts of public 
safety personnel and first-responders to rapidly and effectively take action in 
emergency situations.16  The command system seeks to prevent the 
dissemination of unreliable information, inadequate communications and poor 
coordination among relevant emergency responders, and reduce jurisdictional 
conflicts among government officials.17  In addition, a salient objective of ICS 
is to advance the capabilities of decision makers to grasp an awareness of 
dynamic, and often rapidly changing, crisis situations and the public safety 
implications.18 
 
 11. Aileen M. Marty, Hurricane Katrina: A Deadly Warning Mandating Improvement to the 
National Response to Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 423, 433 (2007). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 426. 
 14. See Bigley & Roberts, supra note 6, at 1282. 
 15. Federal and state agencies that have adopted ICS management concepts include the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which requires the use of an incident command 
system for emergency response to hazardous materials incidents.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 
(2002) (this same section in Appendix C, subsection (6), contains an extensive discussion of the 
Incident Command System).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q) (applying the federal 
government’s emergency response to hazardous substance releases); 6 U.S.C. § 317 (2006) 
(regarding the operation of regional offices within the Department of Homeland Security).  State 
statutes that have mandated the use of an incident command system, include: ALASKA STAT. §§ 
26.23.075(c), 26.23.077(b), (c) (2002); IND. CODE § 10-14-3-10.6(d) (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
48-928(o) (2004); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/20 (West 2006). 
 16. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120(q)(3)(ii) (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin, What Is an Incident 
Command Center, http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/ics/what_is_ics.html (last visited January 6, 
2010) (“ICS is a standardized on-scene incident management concept designed specifically to 
allow respondents to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and 
demands of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional 
boundaries.”). 
 18. See, e.g., id. (“An ICS enables integrated communication and planning by establishing a 
manageable span of control.”). 
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As a functioning management system, ICS includes units that focus on 
command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration.19  These 
units work in concert to enhance control and remove chaos from the 
emergency response effort.20  Understanding that any emergency response 
situation, regardless of scope, will likely occur with no warning, ICS seeks to 
eliminate common problems that emergency responders may face.21  Problems 
such as the flow of reliable incident information, defining jurisdictional lines 
of authority, and development of coordinated incident objectives may severely 
hamper emergency response efforts.22 
For college and university administrators, the challenge of responding to 
an on-campus emergency may be even more daunting given the diversified and 
decentralized structure of the campus environment.  Therefore, the higher 
education community should give careful consideration to the methods and 
management approaches, such as ICS, that attempt to improve coordination 
and effectiveness. 
III.  A VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING CAMPUS SAFETY CASE 
LAW 
Common law decisions addressing disputes regarding safety and security 
concerns at colleges and universities can be traced to the early twentieth 
century.  In the 1913 Gott v. Berea College23 case, the court found that the 
doctrine of in loco parentis granted institutional administrators the power to 
unilaterally bar certain activities by students in the interest of protecting the 
college and student community.24  The case involved the enforcement of the 
college’s rule which barred students from “forbidden places”—specifically, a 
local eating place.25  Students who refused to abide by the college’s rule were 
subject to expulsion.26  The plaintiff, an owner of a local restaurant, sought an 
injunction to prevent enforcement of the college’s rule because it would injure 
his business.27  Finding that the college had the authority to adopt rules to 
protect the students, the court stated: 
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral 
welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that 
end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or 
 
 19. MOLINO, supra note 3, at 7; see also Parker, supra note 4, at 26. 
 20. Parker, supra note 4, at 28. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913). 
 24. Id. at 205. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether 
the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to 
the discretion of the authorities or parents, as the case may be, and, in the 
exercise of that discretion, the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the 
rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy.28 
Thus, by acknowledging that the relationship between the college and the 
student was characterized by the in loco parentis doctrine, colleges and 
universities were granted authority to impose reasonable restrictions for the 
best interest of the students.29 
As student activism during the 1960s and 1970s unfolded at college 
campuses across the United States, courts abandoned the in loco parentis 
doctrine, and the link between colleges and students came to be viewed as a 
contractual relationship.30  The consequential questions became whether 
colleges and universities have a duty to provide campus safety and security, 
and to what extent an institution may be legally liable when a breach of 
security occurs.31 
In Mullins v. Pine Manor College,32 a student was abducted from her 
dormitory room and raped.33  The plaintiff sued the college for negligence, and 
the state court held that the college had a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
providing campus security.34  Although recognizing the decline of the in loco 
parentis doctrine, the court reasoned that the college maintained a duty to 
protect the well-being of its resident students.35  The court found that the 
college could not abandon any effort to protect students, and parents and 
students had a reasonable expectation that the college would provide adequate 
security.36  In ruling that the college was negligent, the court pointed to 
evidence indicating that the college had a deficient security system, improperly 
supervised security guards, faulty locks, and other findings that demonstrated 
the college’s failures were the substantial cause of the harm.37  For these 
 
 28. Gott, 161 S.W. at 206. 
 29. Id. at 207. 
 30. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding 
that a tax-supported college was required to grant students due process before expulsion from the 
institution for misconduct).  See also Kristen Peters, Protecting the Millennial College Student, 
16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST., 431, 437 (2007). 
 31. Oren R. Griffin, Confronting the Evolving Safety and Security Challenge at Colleges and 
Universities, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 413, 418 (2007). 
 32. 449 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Mass. 1983). 
 33. Id. at 334. 
 34. Id. at 340. 
 35. Id. at 335–36. 
 36. Id. at 336. 
 37. Mullins, 449 N.E.2d at 338. 
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reasons, the court found that the college’s failures proximately caused the 
student’s injuries.38 
In Eiseman v. State,39 however, the State University College at Buffalo 
avoided liability regarding the rape and murder of a student that occurred on its 
campus.40  Larry Campbell, an ex-felon with a history of drug abuse, criminal 
conduct, and diagnoses with several mental health disorders that included 
schizophrenia,  was conditionally released from prison in December 1975 after 
pleading guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs and receiving a six-
year sentence.41  In the spring semester of 1976, Campbell began taking classes 
at the college and lived on campus after being admitted to a state-wide 
program designed to offer higher education opportunities to disadvantaged 
high school graduates.42  Within a few months after living on campus, 
Campbell murdered two students, one of whom was Rhomna Eiseman, and 
inflicted serious injuries upon another nonstudent.43  Subsequently, Eiseman’s 
representatives filed suit alleging that the college breached its duty to protect 
students from the unreasonable risk and foreseeable danger posed by 
Campbell.44 
The court held that there was no justification for imposing such a duty, and 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ claims centered on whether a college has a 
legal duty to shield its students from harm when the college admits an ex-felon 
as part of an approved special program.45  The court found that the college had 
no heightened duty of inquiry relative to Campbell’s prior imprisonment, nor 
did it have an obligation to restrict Campbell’s contact with other students.46  
Absolving the college of any liability for acts or omission regarding Eiseman’s 
death, the court stated, “while hindsight has a peculiar clarity and wisdom, the 
fact remains that the contemporaneous, non-reviewable judgments by which 
the college’s actions must be evaluated were that Campbell, upon his release, 
needed no psychiatric care or other treatment, and further that he had a 
potential for success in college.”47 
In Peschke v. Carroll College,48 John Aills shot a food service employee 
on May 18, 1990, at Carroll College in Helena, Montana.49  Shortly before the 
 
 38. Id. at 339. 
 39. 511 N.E.2d 1128 (N.Y. 1987). 
 40. Id. at 1130. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1131–32. 
 43. Id. at 1132. 
 44. Eiseman, 511 N.E.2d at 1136. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 929 P.2d 874 (Mont. 1997). 
 49. Id. at 876. 
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shooting, Aills and a companion entered the chapel located on the Carroll 
College campus where Father Courtney was conducting mass.50  During mass, 
the campus priest observed that Aills had a handgun in his possession.51  Aills 
and his companion were also sources of disruption during mass, hollering and 
banging on pews.52  Father Courtney confronted Aills about his behavior and 
detected the smell of alcohol on Aills’ breath and subsequently escorted Aills 
from the chapel.53  Aills left the chapel and entered the college cafeteria where 
he shot the plaintiff, Emma Peschke, in the chest.54 
The plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the college alleging that 
Father Courtney failed to provide a proper warning or notify the security 
personnel prior to the shooting.55  According to the plaintiff, either Father 
Courtney or the college had a duty to arrest, disarm, or remove Aills from the 
campus prior to the shooting.56  The jury returned a verdict finding that the 
college was not negligent, and the plaintiff sought a new trial—which the court 
denied.57  The court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict that the college did not breach its duty.58  There was no history of 
serious security problems at Carroll College or criminal activities with persons 
visiting the campus.59  The plaintiff did call a security expert to testify, who 
criticized the fact that the college failed to post the 911 emergency phone 
number signs and that the campus lacked radio communications.60  On cross-
examination, however, plaintiff’s expert witness admitted that he had not 
reviewed crime statistics for the college or the surrounding city, nor had the 
security expert ever been to the Carroll campus.61  In short, the court found that 
there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict and insufficient 
evidence that the trial court abused its discretionary power.62  Thus, the jury’s 
verdict in favor of the college was affirmed.63 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 878. 
 52. Id. at 876. 
 53. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 876. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 878. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Peschke, 929 P.2d at 881.  In Kane v. Board of Governors, an associate professor was 
shot and killed on campus by a student who issued threats before the shooting. 356 N.E.2d 1340, 
1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).  The professor’s surviving wife brought a damages claim for wrongful 
death and sought declaratory relief.  Id.  The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court 
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A wrongful death action in Gragg v. Wichita State University,64 was 
brought against Wichita State University (WSU) by the heirs of Barbara Gragg 
after she and a companion were shot and killed while leaving the Celebrate ‘93 
fireworks display, an Independence Day event held on the WSU campus July 
4, 1993.65  Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that WSU failed to provide 
adequate security, install sufficient lighting, or issue warnings about potential 
criminal activity near the campus.66 
Since 1976, WSU had held a Fourth of July event every year at WSU’s 
Cessna Stadium.67  A coordinating committee met several times prior to the 
event and included members from the university administration, such as the 
WSU Director of Community Relations and Special Events.68  The WSU 
police department was directly involved in preparing the security plan before 
the event and had been for ten years prior to the 1993 Celebrate event.69  
Moreover, WSU’s President granted authority for the use of Cessna Stadium 
for the fireworks portion of the event, which was open to the public.70  
Although the university was significantly involved in the event, a cooperative 
effort between the Wichita Police Department and the WSU police department 
provided security.71 
Anthony Scott, a member of a street gang known as the “Insane Crips,” 
shot Gragg.72  Scott had been involved in previous gang-related shootings and 
attended the Celebrate ‘93 event looking for members of a rival gang known as 
the “Junior Boys.”73  After the fireworks display, Gragg and her companion 
left the WSU stadium by taking a short walk across a grassy field on the WSU 
south campus when Scott shot and killed them.74  Following the shooting, 
police in the area responded and quickly apprehended Scott.75  He was 
subsequently charged with murder and later convicted.76 
In the civil action brought by Gragg’s surviving family members, the court 
found that WSU owed no duty to protect Gragg from the criminal acts of an 
 
decision dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint and finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s sole 
remedy was provided by the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act.  Id. at 1345. 
 64. 934 P.2d 121 (Kan. 1997). 
 65. Id. at 125. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 126. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 127. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 126. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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unknown third party.77  The plaintiff relied on § 318 of the Restatement of 
Torts, which refers to the duty a possessor of land has to control the conduct of 
third parties.78  The court, however, noted that this provision did not apply 
because WSU lacked sufficient knowledge to control Scott’s actions.79 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended that liability should also be extended 
to the Celebrate ‘93 corporate sponsors, which included several radio stations 
and corporations.80  The plaintiffs argued that these sponsors were possessors 
of the WSU campus, were engaged in a joint venture with WSU, and exercised 
the requisite control of Celebrate ‘93 through a coordinating committee.81  
Relying on the Restatement of Torts § 328E, a possessor of land requires 
occupation of the land with the intent to control it.82  In order to determine 
liability, the court recognized the critical factors on causation of the harm 
included either occupation with the intent to control the conditions or proof 
that the alleged wrongdoer had the right to control the conditions.83  The court 
concluded that assessing liability against the sponsors as possessors of land 
would be consistent with finding that the sponsors had a duty to provide 
reasonably safe conditions on the premises.84  The Restatement definition of 
duty, however, confirms that no duty exists if the actor has no right of control 
over the conditions causing the harm.85  Relying on a Kansas appellate 
decision, the court noted the following: 
In a premises liability case, in order to be liable, the party charged must have 
had control over the premises in question.  It is obvious that, without control, 
the responsibility for the dangerous or hazardous condition cannot exist. To put 
it another way, a party may not be held responsible for a condition which he or 
she did not cause and which he or she has no ability to remedy.86 
The sponsors involved in Celebrate ‘93 at the WSU campus had a limited 
role, and did not have the authority to manage the WSU campus facilities or 
security measures implemented for the event.87  The court recognized that 
WSU had direct control for security, and sponsorship did not establish a right 
 
 77. Id. at 135. 
 78. Id. at 128. 
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 344 (1965).  These sections deal with 
the duty to protect that may be owed by a possessor of land, and as the Kansas Supreme Court 
held, neither was applicable in the instant case.  Gragg, 934 P.2d at 129. 
 80. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 127. 
 81. Id. at 130. 
 82. Id. (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 131. 
 85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. a (1965). 
 86. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 130–131 (quoting Rogers v. Omega Concrete Sys. Inc., 883 P.2d 
1204, 1207 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 87. Id. at 131. 
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of control.88  Moreover, the court made a distinction between sponsoring an 
event and being responsible for the actions that take place at an event, and held 
that the sponsors lacked the control to establish that they were possessors of 
the WSU premises or owed some duty to Gragg that was violated.89 
As for whether a sufficient special relationship existed that created a duty 
which WSU owed to Gragg, the court indicated that WSU had control and 
possession of the premises for the Celebrate ‘93 event.90  WSU’s ownership 
and control of the property, however, did not automatically establish that WSU 
had a duty to Gragg to prevent the shooting.91  The court acknowledged the 
Supreme Court of Kansas’ well-recognized decision in Nero v. Kansas State 
University,92 which involved a sexual assault in a co-ed housing unit.93  The 
university in Nero knew the attacker’s history of sexual assault, but proceeded 
to place him in a dormitory with the victim without warning the occupants.94  
Denying the university’s motion for summary judgment, the Court held that “a 
state university owes student tenants the same duty to exercise due care for 
their protection as a private landowner owes to its tenants.”95  The facts in 
Nero, however, differ significantly from the facts raised against WSU.  Based 
on the totality of the circumstances, the attack that led to Graggs’ death was 
unanticipated and unexpected.96  Put another way, the court dismissed the 
action against WSU because the shooting on the WSU campus following the 
Celebrate ‘93 event was unforeseeable to the reasonably prudent person.97 
The case of McEnaney v. State98 involved a December 1994 incident 
where a student entered a lecture hall at the State University of New York at 
Albany (“SUNYA”) and proceeded to hold a professor and several students at 
gunpoint, including Jason McEnaney.99  The student gunman, Ralph Tortorici, 
allowed the professor to call certain public officials.100  While police were 
called to the scene, Tortorici threatened the students who remained hostages.101  
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 132. 
 90. Id. at 132–33 
 91. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 133. 
 92. 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993). 
 93. Id. at 772. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 780 (citations omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 135 (citing Cupples v. State, 861 P.2d 1360 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) 
(defining foreseeability as “a common-sense perception of the risks involved in certain situations 
and includes whatever is likely enough to happen that a reasonably prudent person would take it 
into account”)). 
 98. 700 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 99. Id. at 259. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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Recognizing that the gunman was distracted, McEnanery took action to disarm 
Tortorici and was shot in the struggle.102  Tortorici was taken into custody and 
subsequently charged and convicted of first-degree assault, kidnapping, and 
other crimes.103 
The plaintiff subsequently filed a suit against the State of New York and 
SUNYA alleging that the university was negligent in providing proper security 
for its students, which proximately caused McEnaney’s injuries.104  McEnaney 
further claimed that SUNYA breached the duty of care that it owed to students 
in its capacity as a landowner.105  The Court of Claims granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, affirmed the complaint’s dismissal.106  The court’s finding rested 
upon a close review of the plaintiff’s allegation, challenging the adequacy of 
SUNYA’s overall security system and its particular security provisions and 
practices.107  These activities, providing police protection through campus 
security, involved the state university’s fulfillment of its governmental 
function, not its propriety capacity as a landowner.108  The court found this 
inquiry determinative based on well-settled law that a state university is 
immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their 
governmental function unless the injured party can establish a special 
relationship.109  SUNYA’s failure to adopt certain security measures, 
implement an overall security plan, or warn of potential criminal activity were 
governmental functions because they grew directly out of the failure to allocate 
police resources.110  Hence, the specific acts and omissions alleged in the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit flowed from the performance of governmental functions, not 
propriety functions.111  Nor did the plaintiff allege that a special relationship 
existed between himself and the state university, or that the university assumed 
a legal duty, via promise, action, or otherwise, to protect him from criminal 
 
 102. Id. at 260; see also Man Sentenced in Albany Hostage Drama N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
1996, at A29. 
 103. McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 259. 
 104. Id. at 259–60. 
 105. Id. at 260. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 261. 
 108. McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 260. 
 109. Id.  The Court recognized that the special duty rule is a limited exception to the general 
rule: “The general rule reflects the judicial recognition that a governmental entity’s allocation of 
limited public resources to provide security to the public remains a matter of legislative and 
executive decision making, as it requires the exercise of discretion in making the necessary policy 
tradeoffs between various security measures.”  Id. 
 110. Id. at 262. 
 111. Id. 
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acts of third parties.112  Given this reality, the court found the state university 
immune from liability.113 
At issue in Letsinger v. Drury College114 was whether a student occupant 
who shot at a fraternity house on the Drury College campus in Springfield, 
Missouri could sustain a negligence claim against the college and fraternity.115  
In May 1997, the plaintiff, John Letsinger, was shot at a house occupied by the 
Beta Iota chapter of Kappa Alpha fraternity on the Drury College campus.116  
Before the shooting, a hostile telephone exchange took place between 
Letsinger and an unidentified caller, where Letsinger eventually told the caller 
to shut up or come over and fight.117  Joe Lee Daniel soon arrived at the 
fraternity house, pulled out a gun, and shot Letsinger.118  Letsinger alleged that 
the college was negligent in that it failed to provide basic security, and that this 
breach proximately caused his injuries.119 
The Supreme Court of Missouri acknowledged that, as a general rule, the 
college had no duty to protect a person from deliberate criminal attacks by a 
third person.120  The court, however, noted that an exception to this rule exists 
when: (1) a landlord-tenant relationship exists between two parties, and (2) 
other “special circumstances” exist, warranting a shift of responsibility for the 
tenant’s security from the tenant to the landlord.121  Although the lower court 
granted the college’s motion for summary judgment, the record in the case 
indicated that there was no express contract or agreement defining the 
existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the 
college, or the plaintiff and Kappa Alpha fraternity.122  The court found that the 
record included conflicting and contradictory evidence regarding the existence 
of a landlord-tenant relationship.123  While the circuit court granted the college 
and fraternity summary judgment, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the decision because material issues of fact existed about whether a 
landlord-tenant relationship existed and the character of plaintiff’s occupancy 
as a tenant or licensee.124 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. McEnaney, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 263. 
 114. 68 S.W.3d 408, 409 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 115. Id. at 409. 
 116. Id. at 410. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Letsinger, 68 S.W.3d at 410. 
 120. Id. at 411. 
 121. Id. at 410. 
 122. Id. at 410–11. 
 123. Id. at 411. 
 124. Letsinger, 68 S.W.3d at 412. 
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RLI Insurance Co. v. Simon’s Rock Early College125 centered on a dispute 
between a college’s primary insurance carrier and its excess liability insurer 
regarding whether actions by the college and its employees that arguably led to 
a on-campus shooting spree constituted a single occurrence under the college’s 
primary insurance policy.126  The court found that all claims resulting from the 
eighteen-minute shooting spree on December 14, 1992 at Bard College at 
Simon’s Rock in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, constituted a single 
occurrence that would obligate the primary insurer to its one million dollar per 
occurrence limit, and obligate the excess liability insurer to begin payment 
upon exhaustion of the primary insurance policy limit.127 
The facts set forth in this case, however, illustrate more than whether 
multiple events involved in an active shooting incident on a college campus 
can constitute a single occurrence for insurance purposes.  The pertinent facts 
identified by the Massachusetts appellate court pointed out the opportunity 
college officials had, but apparently missed, that could have averted the 
shooting.128  For instance, the college knew that a package was sent to the 
student shooter, Wayne Lo, with a suspicious return address containing the 
notation “Classic Arms.”129  While the package raised concerns among 
residence hall directors and a college dean, the school eventually delivered the 
package to Lo.130  After receiving the package, the student refused to permit 
college officials to view its contents, but did explain that he had some 
weapons-related items as a gift for his father.131  More importantly, the facts 
presented in the case indicate that later that same day, college officials received 
information that Lo did indeed have a gun and that he intended to kill.132  
Shortly thereafter, those on campus heard gunfire, signaling the start of Lo’s 
shooting spree.133  The facts arguably suggest that college officials might have 
missed an opportunity to avert this tragic shooting, which resulted in death.  
But what may be more striking from the facts of this case is the absence of a 
coherent, systematic response to a safety threat. 
 
 125. 765 N.E.2d 247 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
 126. Id.; see also Anthony DePalma, Questions Outweigh Answers In Shooting Spree at 
College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A1. 
 127. Simon’s Rock Early Coll., 765 N.E.2d at 254. 
 128. Id. at 251. 
 129. Id. at 249. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 249–50.  Upon entering Lo’s room, the residence hall director observed empty 
black plastic magazines, a black plastic rifle stock, and an empty metallic army surplus cartridge 
box.  Id. 
 132. Simon’s Rock Early Coll., 765 N.E.2d at 250. 
 133. Id. 
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In Rogers v. Delaware State University,134 the court reversed and 
remanded, in part, a summary judgment decision granted for Delaware State 
University (DSU) in a lawsuit brought by a student to recover damages for 
injuries sustained as a result of a targeted attack.135  The situation began when 
a female student, fleeing her ex-boyfriend, asked the plaintiff-student to drive 
her to the police station.136  Later that same evening, the ex-boyfriend, who 
suspected that the plaintiff-student and the female student had an intimate 
relationship, shot the plaintiff in the face.137  All events relevant to the shooting 
happened at a motel that the university used as a supplemental student housing 
facility.138  The plaintiff applied for on-campus student housing, but due to 
excessive demand, numerous students, including the plaintiff, were placed in 
supplemental housing at an off-campus location.139  The court found that the 
university maintained no obligation to provide reasonable safety measures at 
the motel location, even though it housed students.140 
A lower court granted DSU’s motion for summary judgment, finding the 
attack was neither foreseeable nor preventable, and that deficient security 
measures did not cause the plaintiff’s injuries.141  The Delaware Superior Court 
specifically found that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an unforeseeable 
targeted attack, and that the university owed the plaintiff no duty to protect 
him.142  On appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court found material 
issues of fact existed regarding whether the attack was foreseeable, and the 
proximate cause of the student shooting.143  As to what obligation the 
university had to protect the student from harm, the court stated, “Although 
DSU has a duty to exercise reasonable care when it undertakes to provide 
housing off campus for its students, this was not a contractual duty.”144 
DeSanto v. Youngstown State University145 involved a student shooting 
that occurred off-campus, but that was triggered by a verbal altercation 
following a dance held at an on-campus pub.146  Jermaine Hopkins, a student 
enrolled at Youngstown State University, attended a dance at the pub on 
 
 134. No. 542,2005, 2006 WL 2085460, at *1 (Del. July 25, 2006). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Rogers, 2006 WL 2085460, at *2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Rogers, 2006 WL 2085460, at *2. 
 145. No. 99-08777, 2002 WL 31966960, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Cl. July 31, 2002). 
 146. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL AND MANAGERIAL PARADIGM 257 
January 27, 1996.147  Sometime after midnight, a fight ensued and campus 
police officers arrived on the scene, ended the dance, and began to disperse the 
crowd of over 150 people.148  As people were leaving the pub, in the presence 
of campus police officers, a verbal altercation between Hopkins and Timothy 
Slocum took place in the lobby during which Slocum threatened to kill 
Hopkins.149  Although Hopkins had to be physically restrained by a campus 
police officer, the dispute with Slocum did not escalate, and the campus police 
officers ended the party.150  Later that same evening, Eric Moore, a nonstudent, 
shot Hopkins in relation to the earlier altercation.151  After being transported to 
the hospital, Hopkins died.152 
Hopkins’ parents filed a lawsuit, alleging that the state university was 
negligent because the campus police officers failed to arrest or detain Slocum 
after he threatened to kill their son.153  The court, however, found that campus 
police officers’ primary objective at the dance was to disperse the unruly 
crowd and that the officers’ decision to arrest Slocum was discretionary.154  
Also, expert testimony provided at trial indicated that an arrest during the 
confrontation might have heightened tension and made the situation more 
dangerous.155  Thus, the court found the decision not to arrest Slocum for 
threatening to kill Hopkins reasonable.156 
Furthermore, the university did not owe Hopkins a duty beyond that owed 
to the general public.157  The plaintiffs could not demonstrate that Hopkins had 
a special relationship with the university or that the university owed Hopkins a 
special duty distinct and separate from the duty owed to the general public.158  
The plaintiffs’ negligence claim also failed because they could not show 
proximate cause.159  Eric Moore, a nonstudent, shot and killed Hopkins.160  
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *1. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at *2. 
 155. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *2. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  To establish a special relationship, the following elements must exist: “1) an 
assumption by the governmental entity of a duty to act on behalf of the injured party either 
through promises or actions; 2) knowledge on the part of the governmental agents that inaction 
could lead to harm; 3) some form of direct contact between the governmental agents and the 
injured party; and 4) the injured party’s justifiable reliance on the governmental entity’s 
affirmative undertaking.” Id. (citing Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ohio 1998)). 
 159. Id. at *3. 
 160. DeSanto, 2002 WL 31966960, at *3. 
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Plaintiffs failed to show how arresting or detaining Slocum would have 
prevented Moore from shooting Hopkins.161 
Despite Youngstown State University’s successful defense of the 
plaintiff’s negligence and wrongful death claims, the troubling legacy of this 
case is that within a few hours after a student’s life was threatened on-campus, 
the student was actually shot and killed.  While the court’s reasoning found the 
university not liable on the merits, the circumstances presented suggest that the 
campus police officers may have missed an opportunity to do more—perhaps 
even something that could have saved Hopkins’s life.  Could the campus police 
officers on the scene have spoken to Hopkins about the threat?  Should local 
police have been contacted?  Should there have been an assessment of the 
threat and its likely probability?  On the other hand, would any of these actions 
have been construed as an assumption of an affirmative duty by the state 
university to act, thereby opening the door to the creation of a special 
relationship and potentially exposing the university to tort liability?  These 
questions remain unanswered but may provide important insights into the 
advancement of campus safety at American colleges and universities. 
While judicial reasoning applied by courts to threats regarding campus 
safety no longer embrace the tenets of the in loco parentis doctrine, as 
demonstrated in the 1913 Gott decision, it is difficult to find complete 
sanctuary in the campus safety and security approaches that may escape 
scrutiny because an institution’s actions are protected by the sovereign 
immunity or particularized tort law arguments absolving a college or university 
of a legal duty to act.  The tragic circumstances examined in cases like Gragg, 
McEnaney, and DeSanto are likely to be repeated in similar fashion at other 
campuses across the nation, and university counsel and administrations are 
likely to use similar arguments to defend their institutions.  The campus safety 
and security dilemma that confronts higher education demands innovative legal 
and statutory efforts to protect and preserve the college and university 
community. 
IV.  FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTORY EFFORTS INTENDED TO ADVANCE 
CAMPUS SAFETY INITIATIVES AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
The concern of lawmakers and governmental officials to violence and 
security problems at colleges and universities has led to legislative action.  As 
will be discussed in this section, many states have considered and passed laws 
requiring disclosure of crime statistics and data relevant to security threats.  
Some statutes have even mandated enhanced coordination among first-
responders and emergency personnel, including implementation of ICS 
concepts.  Such enactments represent an important component in the campus 
safety effort that demands careful consideration. 
 
 161. Id. 
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The New Jersey Campus Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act162 was 
signed into law in December 1994 to provide certain rights for victims of 
campus-related sexual assaults.163  The statute accords a series of rights to 
“victims of sexual assaults that occur on the campus of any public or 
independent institution of higher education in the State . . . .”164  Among the 
rights provided by the statute are the right to have allegations of sexual assault 
treated seriously, the right to be treated with dignity, and the right to be free 
from pressure from campus personnel to report or refrain from reporting 
crimes.165  While these rights as set out by the statute may demonstrate the 
intent to be sensitive to the concerns of sexual assault victims, they may raise 
expectations that are difficult to satisfy.  For example, while it is admirable to 
avoid placing pressure on an assault victim, law enforcement officials may 
need detailed reports and information of the crime to pursue and arrest the 
perpetrator. 
Furthermore, section 2 of the statute indicates that victims have the right 
“to be free from any suggestion that victims should refrain from reporting 
crimes in order to avoid unwanted personal publicity.”166  While this provision 
may accommodate a victim’s interest in avoiding public attention, it may 
interfere with an institution’s campus safety objectives.167  Colleges and 
universities, acting in conjunction with law enforcement, may need wide 
discretion when responding to threats to the campus community.  Victims or 
persons with knowledge regarding crimes or offenses may be the only source 
of information about criminal incidents.  Thus, college and university 
administrators should be given some reasonable level of discretion to 
investigate and pursue perpetrators of crimes committed against students and 
others on campus.168  While the language cited in the New Jersey Campus 
Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights may be seen as burdensome to campus 
administrators, it triggers an important discussion regarding the importance of 
remaining sensitive to the privacy of crime victims on college and university 
campuses. 
 
 162. The New Jersey Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
18A:61E-1–6 (West 1999). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 18A:61E-2. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. § 18A:61E-2(d). 
 167. The New Jersey Sexual Assault Victim’s Bill of Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
18A:61E-5.  Section 5 of the statute states that nothing in the statute should be construed to 
preclude the reporting of crimes or offenses to law enforcement officers.  The language used to 
articulate victim rights in section 2, however, appears to contradict section 5. 
 168. See id. § 18A:61E-6 (insulating colleges and universities from liability unless there is 
evidence of reckless, willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct). 
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The Kristin Smart Campus Security Act169 requires California post-
secondary institutions receiving public funding to enter into written agreements 
with local law enforcement agencies regarding coordination and responsibility 
for investigating criminal activity on or near campuses.170  The California 
statute was passed, at least in part, to clarify the operational responsibilities for 
investigations of crimes that occur on college and university campuses among 
campus law enforcement agencies and local law enforcement agencies.171  The 
statute was passed after the California Senate held hearings regarding the May 
1996 disappearance of Kristin Smart, a student at California Polytechnic State 
University at San Luis Obispo.172  Following reports of her disappearance, 
multiple law enforcement agencies were involved in the investigation.173  The 
statute is intended to improve coordination among agencies participating in 
criminal investigations at higher education institutions.174  Section 67381 
provides that the written agreement entered into by colleges, universities, and 
law enforcement agencies shall delineate geographical boundaries for each 
agency’s operational responsibility.175  This approach is similar to the ICS-
NIMS rationale, and suggests that California lawmakers recognize the 
importance of highly coordinated campus security efforts.176 
The Oklahoma Campus Safety Act177 addresses concerns relative to the 
establishment and jurisdictional authority of campus police departments.178  
The Act extends to public and private institutions of higher education, as well 
as public school districts within Oklahoma and grants the these institutions’ 
governing boards the power to commission campus police officers and revoke 
such commission for any reason.179  Furthermore, the Act provides that 
municipalities and county sheriffs’ departments may enter into agreements 
with campus police departments to recognize and clarify jurisdictional 
boundaries.180  While coordination is encouraged in the form of “mutual 
 
 169. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67381 (West 2003). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See S.B. 1729, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998). 
 172. Id.; see also Decade Passes; Pain Lingers, RECORDNET, May 25, 2006, 
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060525/NEWS01/605250335/1001. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Cal. S.B. 1729. 
 175. Id.  It is important to point out that staff comments regarding the state senate bill that 
eventually passed as the Kristin Smart Campus Safety Act of 1998 indicated that it was unclear 
what problem the bill was trying to correct and whether the bill would have the intended effect.  
Id.  The staff comments also stated that some campuses shared boundaries with more than one 
local law enforcement agency and might have to establish several written agreements.  Id. 
 176. See supra Part II. 
 177. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 360.15 (West 2003). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. § 360.18(A)–(B). 
 180. Id. § 360.20. 
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assistance agreements,” the Act does not seek to create an agent-principal 
relationship between the campus police officer and any municipality or 
county.181  Thus, while the Act’s provisions may be viewed as narrow or 
limited in scope, overall, the Act acknowledges the need for coordinated law 
enforcement efforts to effectively respond to campus security threats. 
Although originally passed into law in 1994, the State of Illinois Campus 
Security Act182 has undergone important modifications resulting in new 
requirements for state colleges and universities.183  While section 10 of the Act 
provides for the establishment of a community task force to coordinate crime 
prevention activities with community leaders and service providers, the 
provision does not address concerns that might be raised among colleges and 
universities with particularity.184  In 2008, the legislature amended the Campus 
Security Act and effectively re-named it the Campus Security Enhancement 
Act of 2008, adding section 20 to the Act.185  Section 20, subtitled “campus 
security enhancement,” directly responds to concerns regarding higher 
education institutions.186  Accordingly, section 20 requires each institution of 
higher education in the state to develop a NIMS, “a multi-jurisdictional 
campus violence prevention plan.”187  Implementation of the plan will include 
training and exercises, the formation of a campus violence prevention 
committee, and a campus threat assessment team.188  In addition, county and 
regional officials with the appropriate emergency management agencies will 
also be required to provide assistance throughout the planning and training 
process.189  Thus, section 20 of the Illinois Campus Security Act, which 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/1 (West 2006). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 12/10. 
 185. Id. 12/20. 
 186. Id. 12/20. 
 187. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 12/20 (West 2006). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.  Specifically, county and regional officials, along with the appropriate emergency 
management agencies, shall assist in the planning and training involved with developing: 
A National Incident Management System-compliant, all-hazards, emergency response 
plan in partnership with the institution’s county or major municipal emergency 
management official, report the plan to this official, and have training and exercises for 
the plan annually at a minimum; and (2) develop an inter-disciplinary and multi-
jurisdictional campus violence prevention plan, including coordination of and 
communication between all available campus and local mental health and first response 
resources, in partnership with the institution’s county or major municipal emergency 
management official, report the plan to this official, and have training and exercises for 
the plan annually at a minimum.  The campus violence prevention plan shall include the 
development and implementation of a campus violence prevention committee and campus 
threat assistance team.   
Id. 
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became effective January 1, 2009, seeks to develop a fully integrated campus 
security approach.190 
Passage of the Act came in the aftermath of the tragic shooting that 
occurred in February 2008 at the Northern Illinois University campus.191  
Following passage of the Campus Security Enhancement Act, the University’s 
President John Peters said: 
[W]e learned all too well on February 14th, it is necessary for our colleges and 
universities to have emergency operations plans in place . . . . I commend the 
Illinois General Assembly and the Governor for recognizing, through the 
passage of this Act, the importance of adequate campus security procedures 
and responses to protect our students, faculty and staff.192 
The Illinois law represents a step forward for campus safety at colleges and 
universities, but will require continual political and community support to 
ensure effective implementation of the law’s ambitious provisions. 
In Kentucky, colleges and universities must adhere to the Campus Safety 
and Security Act,193 also known as the Michael Minger Act, after Michael 
Minger, a student killed in a residence hall fire on the Murray State University 
campus.194  The governor signed the Act into law in March 2000.195  It grants 
the fire marshal substantial jurisdictional authority over property at public and 
private institutions of higher education for the administration and enforcement 
of laws designed to protect the public from fire loss.196  The Minger Act 
incorporates concepts consistent with the Incident Command System by 
consolidating decision-making authority with the fire marshal regarding threats 
of fire or arson that may occur on college and university campuses.197  It is 
important to note that the Kentucky statute applies to the entire campus, 
including residential facilities operated by any recognized student 
organization.198  This would include facilities operated by student 
 
 190. Id. 12/99. 
 191. Press Release, Office of Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor Blagojevich Signs Campus 
Security Enhancement Act (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ibhe.org/FridayMemo/misc/ 
080822_SB2691.pdf. 
 192. Id.  (quoting Northern Illinois University President John Peters). 
 193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 194. Disclosure Law Working, UK Official Says, THE CINCINNATI-KENTUCKY POST, Sept. 
10, 2002, at 3K. 
 195. Id. 
 196. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948. 
 197. See Disclosure Law Working, supra note 194 (noting that the goal of the Minger Act 
requires decision-making to occur with the fire marshal, which is consistent with ICS goals of 
coordination between strategic and tactical operations). 
 198. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.948. 
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organizations such as fraternities and sororities that have occasionally been 
involved with disruptive campus activity.199 
In addition, the Act established a crime reporting standard that requires 
Kentucky colleges and universities to maintain a crime log, and report crimes 
and security threats to the campus community.200  The statute also requires 
prompt reporting of criminal incidents, such that disclosure to the public would 
be available within twenty-four hours of the first report.201  The release of 
information, however, may be withheld where there is clear and convincing 
evidence that releasing it may cause a suspect to flee or evade detection, or 
result in the destruction of evidence.202  Thus, the crime reporting provisions of 
the statute are designed to avoid interference with the pursuit and capture of 
criminal suspects, while urging college and university administrators to 
disseminate information about criminal activity as soon as practicable.203 
The statute’s proactive emphasis is further embraced by the requirement 
that postsecondary education institutions design programs to inform students 
and employees about campus safety and security procedures.204  Beyond the 
Act’s crime report provisions, it also directs colleges and universities to 
prepare and equip their students and employees on how to prevent campus 
security breaches.205  The statute demands that administrators at postsecondary 
education institutions develop an informed and knowledgeable campus 
community.  Through information sharing and training, perhaps fewer persons 
will be subject to harm or criminal wrongdoing. 
In 1999, New York Governor George E. Pataki signed into law the state’s 
Campus Safety Act,206 which was dedicated to the memory of Suzanne Lyall, a 
student at State University at New York–Albany, who mysteriously 
disappeared from campus and was never seen again.207  The Act requires 
colleges and universities to promptly investigate violent felonies on college 
campuses and file reports of missing students.208  An additional provision 
requires colleges and universities to disclose crime statistics in campus 
 
 199. See generally Byron L. Leflore, Jr., Alcohol and Hazing Risks in College Fraternities: 
Re-evaluating Vicarious Liability and Custodial Liability of National Fraternities, 7 REV. LITIG. 
191, 192 (1988) (discussing examples of campus interaction with incidents involving fraternities 
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 200. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.9481(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
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catalogs and make clear the scope of authority extended to private college 
security officers appointed to prevent criminal activity on campus.209  More 
importantly, § 6434 requires colleges and universities to “adopt and 
implement” plans for the investigation of violent felony offenses on college 
campuses.210  While the Act does not specify what is required for each 
institution’s plan, it does state that the plan should coordinate investigation and 
reporting efforts among law enforcement agencies.211  The Act’s emphasis on 
coordination is essential to maintaining campus safety and security and, like 
the other statutes, consistent with ICS concepts. 
Finally, it is important to note that Congress recently enacted new 
regulatory changes to federal law pursuant to the reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965.212  On August 14, 2008, President Bush signed the 
Higher Education Opportunity Act (“HEOA” or the “Act”) into law, imposing 
new reporting and disclosure obligations on institutions that participate in Title 
IV federal student financial aid programs.213  More specifically, the Act places 
new requirements on colleges and universities, many in response to tragic 
campus shooting incidents that have resulted in the deaths of students, faculty, 
and staff.214  Among other provisions, the HEOA amends the Jeanne Clery 
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act 
(“Clery Act”)215 by requiring that an institution annually issue a statement of 
current policies regarding immediate emergency response and evacuation 
procedures.216  The policy statement must articulate procedures that will be 
used to notify the campus community upon confirmation of a significant 
emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health 
or safety of students or staff occurring on the campus.217 
The HEOA may prompt college and university administrators to review or 
even reconsider whether campus emergency response efforts are sufficiently 
coordinated for maximum effect.  Where shortcomings are found, strategic 
modifications consistent with ICS concepts should be considered for 
implementation. 
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V.  THE ROLE OF FACULTY AND OTHERS IN CAMPUS SAFETY 
In 1966, the American Association of University Professors, the American 
Council on Education (“ACE”), and the Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges jointly formulated and issued a “Statement on 
Government of Colleges and Universities,” which stated, in part, the following: 
The faculty has primary responsibility for such . . . subject matter and methods 
of instruction, research, faculty status, and those aspects of student life which 
relate to the educational process . . . .  Budgets, personnel limitations, the time 
element, and the policies of other groups, bodies, and agencies having 
jurisdiction over the institution may set limits to realization of faculty 
advice.218 
While this statement appears to set out the activities that are within the purview 
of the faculty, it also indicates that faculty may have limited input regarding 
certain institutional functions.  The traditional roles for faculty at colleges and 
universities have focused on teaching, research, and service.219  Although the 
teaching and research components may be self-defining, the service function is 
diverse and may include activities on-campus and beyond the university 
community.220  Governance, or shared governance, is among the institutional-
based service activities in which both faculty and administrators participate.221 
In addition to contributing to the institution’s governance, faculty can and 
should contribute to the institution’s policy-making process because the faculty 
play a central role at a college or university: “In a very real sense, the faculty is 
the university—its most productive element, its source of distinction.  And 
faculty members are properly partners in the enterprise with areas reserved for 
their exclusive control.”222  As stakeholders in the higher education enterprise, 
the faculty has unique insight with regard to the student population and may 
have the capacity to identify threats to campus safety and security.  Colleges 
and universities should prepare faculty, as well as students and staff, to aid the 
campus safety effort.  In the aftermath of the tragic Virginia Tech shooting, 
law enforcement officials appear to agree that campus safety requires the 
attention of the entire university community: 
Faculty, staff, and students should be trained on how to respond to various 
emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used. This training 
should be delivered through a number of delivery options, such as in-person 
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presentations (i.e., residential life programming; orientation sessions for 
students and employees); Internet-based delivery; and documents.223 
The challenge for legislators, legal counsel, and higher education 
administrators lies not only with campus safety concerns related to law and 
policy, but also implementation of a campus safety and security paradigm 
among the diverse members of the higher education community. 
VI.  RISK MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
The importance of risk management should not be ignored or 
underestimated as colleges and universities work to maintain a safe and secure 
campus environment with the capability to effectively respond to emergency 
situations.  A basic responsibility for any public or private sector entity 
involves assessing the nature and types of risks that confront an organization 
and threaten to interfere with an organization’s mission and objectives.224  The 
assessment of probable risk and corresponding exposure to catastrophic loss 
requires that prudent decision-makers consider action to shift risk, spread risk, 
or reduce risk.225  While these risk management methods can result in certain 
efficiencies, higher education institutions often cannot avoid certain risks via a 
negotiated agreement or by purchasing insurance.226  The wide array of 
activities and programs that are commonplace at most postsecondary 
educational institutions are vast and diverse.227  Higher education institutions 
manage instructional facilities, laboratories, student residential housing, 
apartment complexes, and recreational facilities, provide food services, and a 
host of other operations.228  Students, faculty, and support personnel rely on the 
stability and safety of the higher education environment to pursue their 
academic endeavors and extra-curricular activities.229  Consequently, higher 
education administrators are compelled to utilize various management 
strategies, such as risk management, to mitigate sources of risk exposure.230 
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Conceptually, risk management does not disdain error, loss, or the 
potential for catastrophic events, but rather seeks to understand the probability 
of error, loss, or unintended consequences and transform and minimize the 
likelihood of such events.231  Risk encompasses the concepts of uncertainty, 
probability, and consequences or potential impact.232  The risk management 
process is dedicated to a prospective effort intended to minimize or prevent 
future events that may lead to harmful occurrences.233  Further, risk 
management is an ongoing practice integrated into the structure of an 
organization for the purpose of anticipating preventable adverse events.  More 
importantly, risk management elements complement many facets found in the 
Incident Command System.234 
With respect to campus safety and security, risk management provides 
higher education administrators with a viable construct to evaluate, coordinate, 
and assess the various efforts that are advanced to reduce the consequences of 
poor decision-making and manage risk within a zone of tolerance.235  The 
analysis by higher education administrators, therefore, must consider the 
probability of undesirable events occurring among students and faculty, and 
the severity of such events. 
The initial risk management phase focuses on development of anticipatory 
mechanisms that will allow organizational resources to be used to minimize or 
confine undesirable occurrences.  This phase should result in the production of 
plans that outline procedures to assure the continuous implementation of risk 
management initiatives.  The plans also describe goals, operational and 
technical statements, and organizational structure that would assume 
responsibility for operational integration of risk management concepts.  For 
higher education institutions, integrating risk management concepts into an 
institution’s management processes remains critical because, like ICS 
principles, it provides a viable avenue for colleges and universities to assess 
and review potential threats and develop responses that improve campus safety 
and emergency preparedness. 
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Next, the risk management process should focus on risk assessment and 
identification.  This may include the creation of a risk assessment team 
comprised of personnel with the necessary expertise to discover, analyze, and 
communicate threats to organizational stability.236  Risk identification depends 
on the systematic collection of salient information.237  For higher education, 
emphasis should be placed on the discovery of information regarding risks 
associated with particular academic programs, administrative initiatives, and 
relevant off-campus enterprises.  Once risks are identified through the 
assessment phase, strategies and methods should be selected to achieve the 
goals of risk reduction and increased stability. 
Risk assessment as a risk management tool seeks to critically examine 
programmatic and organizational threats.  Two methods may be applied to 
determine the nature and extent of risk exposure and threats.238  First, remedial 
investigations can be used to collect information about risk exposure, such as 
its origin, configuration, and likely severity.239  A second method used to 
assess risk exposure is prospective: feasibility studies that evaluate possible 
sources of risk and cost-effective ways to minimize risk exposure.240  The 
importance of understanding the nature and extent of a particular exposure and 
developing cost-effective solutions should be a concern for those aspiring to 
manage risk effectively and efficiently.241  Furthermore, risk assessment should 
not be viewed as a static exercise, but rather an on-going process done on a 
regular basis, involving the accumulation of information critically related to 
many organizational activities.242 
While the risk analysis phase may not be wholly independent from the risk 
assessment phase, risk analysis focuses on two tasks.243  First, like risk 
assessment, risk analysis should include a probative review of those variables 
that may expose the organization to liability or harm.244  Next, the analysis 
phase of risk management evaluates and determines the feasibility of proposed 
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remedies that may be utilized to reduce risk exposure.245  The purpose of this 
analytical phase is to generate information on a range of contingencies 
available to avoid or to mitigate those adverse consequences identified as 
threats to the organization or institution.246  Risk analysis should yield risk 
control strategies or risk treatment strategies that decision-makers may 
implement to manage risk.  These strategies may include passive avoidance: a 
conscious decision not to engage in certain risky activities.  Other risk 
treatment strategies include the assumption of certain risks while increasing the 
organization’s capacity to respond to negative outcomes, and transferring or 
shifting risk to other entities through subcontracting efforts or insurance 
acquisition from third parties.  While strategies that may be used to deal with 
risk are unlimited, any approach chosen represents an affirmative effort to 
prevent liability and/or harm to the organization rather than allowing an 
organization to drift haphazardly. 
The stakes are high for college and university administrators as well as 
state and federal lawmakers.  In the aftermath of recent campus shootings, are 
colleges and universities better prepared today to prevent the loss of life by a 
lone gunman or active shooter?  Have state and federal laws provided the 
framework for effective campus safety?  If not, are there synergies that lie in 
incident command systems and risk management concepts that can be 
combined to advance security efforts at educational institutions?  Arguably, 
yes.  While the mission of colleges and universities remains teaching, research, 
and public service, the reality is that campus safety and security must become 
an integrated responsibility of the institution. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: MANAGING THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE GOING FORWARD 
American colleges and universities represent a tremendous global resource.  
These institutions seek to educate individuals, while advancing ingenuity and 
intellectual achievement in numerous academic and professional fields.  To 
allow the important work of higher education to be distracted or compromised 
by campus security threats is unacceptable.  Thus, colleges and universities, 
regardless of size, classification, or mission, should consider incorporation of 
the following: (1) implementation of threat assessment mechanisms that draw 
from existing risk management processes, if any, and conform to incident 
command system concepts that allow for early detection and response to 
emergency situations; (2) development of comprehensive recurring campus 
outreach efforts that teach faculty, staff, and students about potential threats, 
crime statistics, and emergency response protocol; and (3) passage of state and 
federal legislation that clarifies jurisdictional authority and grants law 
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enforcement personnel the discretionary power to act promptly in emergency 
situations, but that also allows penalties and corrective action to be taken 
where discretionary power is abused by law enforcement personnel.  The 
objective should be to develop a legal and managerial paradigm that permits 
colleges and universities to protect its campuses against the modern threats 
without sacrificing the character of these treasured institutions of higher 
education. 
 
